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The SPS Agreement in the WTO exists to regulate the use of import barriers to protect, 
inter alia, human health.  Yet consumers’ preferences for food safety or for other 
information about food, play no part in the Agreement.  The purpose in this paper is to 
argue that consumers’ preferences should be taken into account for food products which 








Department of Economics 




A Contributed Paper presented at the 47th Annual Conference of the Australian 
Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, Fremantle, Western Australia, 12th-14th 
February, 2003Consumers’ Preferences, Credence Goods and the WTO SPS  Agreement 
 
Donald MacLaren 
University of Melbourne 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 Consumers’  preferences  appear to play no direct role in the trade rules of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).  Baldwin (1988) explained this bias, as far as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is concerned, in terms of the political 
economy of those who drafted GATT 1947.  He argued that they recognised that 
producers form more powerful lobby groups than consumers do and, therefore, that the 
trade rules needed to be designed to restrict the ability of governments to pander to the 
self-seeking demands of their producers.  Thus, despite this asymmetry, international 
tensions caused by trade disputes could be reduced or avoided altogether without 
reference to consumers.  Recent evidence from the WTO suggests that this state of affairs 
is no longer true. 
  For food products, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the 
SPS Agreement) is also important in limiting the opportunities for governments to use 
SPS measures for purely protectionist purposes, i.e., for protecting the incomes in their 
farm sector.  This Agreement (WTO, pp. 69-84) is based on the use of scientific evidence 
to determine the standards which imported products have to meet in order to achieve an 
acceptable level of risk (Annex A:1(b)).  The standards to be applied are either those of 
the relevant international organisation which, in the case of food, is the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (Article 3:4), or those determined by the individual 
government (Article 5:1 and 5:3).  If a government opts for its own standard and if that 
standard is more trade restricting than the internationally-set standard, then a formal, 
science-based risk assessment is required (Annex A:5). 
  However, in the way in which risk assessment is usual conducted, only 
probabilities are estimated for particular outcomes (states of nature) in order to decide on 
the appropriate level of risk (Article 5:1).  There are two deficiencies with this approach:  
first, the probabilities used may be vague or ambiguous or just not known at all;  and 
second, there is no economic value put on the costs and benefits of alternatives.  The first 
deficiency might be corrected through application of the precautionary principle (see 
below) or through the use of decision-theoretic models involving non-additive probability 
concepts;  the second would be overcome through the use of an economic framework.
1  
Despite these obvious limitations to the form of risk assessment undertaken in the context 
of the SPS Agreement, this approach is what has been used in decisions by Dispute 
Panels when national standards have been challenged. 
  There is a presumption in the SPS Agreement that consumers should defer to the 
judgement of scientists when trade rules are determined which cover products with 
potential risks to human health.  However, in recent times, such deference has not been 
forthcoming, particularly in Europe and in Japan (Kerr).  The example par excellence of 
this distrust, leading to a lack of deference, occurs with genetically modified foods. It is 
                                                 
1 The use of social benefit-cost analysis has been argued cogently in Anderson et al. (2001), especially Part 
III. 
  1unfortunate that this widely-used generic label does not allow the important distinction to 
be made between transgenic and non-transgenic technologies.
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 Different  attitudes  across  countries towards genetically modified foods are also 
revealed in the different approaches which governments have taken towards regulation.  
Some countries, e.g., Canada and the United States, have based their regulations on the 
principle of equivalence.  If there is a consensus amongst scientists, using a risk 
assessment, that the genetically modified food is substantially equivalent to the non-
genetically modified food, then the former is assumed to be safe (Sheldon and Josling 
(2002, p. 2).  Given this conclusion, there is no need to introduce mandatory labelling and 
this is the position adopted by Canada and the U.S. (Sheldon and Josling, Table 1).  Some 
countries, e.g., those of the European Union (EU), have used the precautionary principle 
and have required mandatory labelling (Sheldon and Josling, Table 1).  Those who use 
the precautionary principle adhere to the position that scientific understanding alters 
through time and that current wisdom may be overturned by new evidence in the future.  
Therefore, it is prudent not to accept the notion of substantial equivalence without 
overwhelming evidence that it is safe to do so (Sheldon and Josling, p. 2).  Finally, still 
other countries, e.g., Australia and New Zealand, have used the principle of equivalence 
but have introduced mandatory labelling (Sheldon and Josling, Table 1). 
  Food, whether imported or domestically produced, has, essentially, either 
‘experience’ or ‘credence’ characteristics.  The latter would include whether or not the 
food contains genetically modified ingredients in the absence of labelling.  It is well 
known that credence characteristics cause a particular form of market failure.  If high 
quality product costs firms more to produce than low quality product and if consumers 
have heterogeneous preferences for quality, which is an unobservable characteristic, then 
high quality products will be under-supplied because firms have no incentive to produce 
them.  Therefore, there is a role for government to play to overcome the information 
asymmetry and, thereby, to increase consumer welfare.  When the imported good is of a 
lower quality than the domestically-produced good, the intervention can take the form of 
banning or regulating the import.  Alternatively, a mandatory labelling scheme could be 
introduced which signals to consumers the source and quality of the product.  This latter 
approach reduces the potential for damaging trade disputes and allows consumers to 
determine, through their preferences, the range of products that they wish to purchase 
(Runge and Jackson).
3  Such a labelling scheme may a continuous one, e.g., the label 
differs for each and every quality, or alternatively, the label is a binary one, e.g., there is 
one label for all qualities of the product above some given level of quality.
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  However, the success of a labelling strategy depends upon the confidence placed 
by consumers on the labelling system which in turn depends upon the ability of the 
government or its agent to test and to monitor (Kerr).  But it may also depend upon 
whether the labelling scheme is a positive one (e.g., ‘this product may contain GMOs’) or 
a negative one (e.g., this product does not contain GMOs).  Runge and Jackson argue that 
a negative scheme is less likely to cause trade problems than a positive one.  However, 
this conclusion presupposes that there is agreement that labelling for GMOs is necessary.  
                                                 
2 The main concerns about transgenic foods, as far as human health is concerned, are allergens and 
carcinogens, and resistance to antibiotics.  There is also concern about the price effects induced by the 
development of oligopolistic and oligopsonistic market structures (Runge and Jackson).  For a discussion of 
the differences in attitudes towards genetically modified foods in various countries, see Hobbs and Plunkett 
(1999). 
3 For an analysis of the economics of food labelling, see Golan et al. (2000). 
4 Labelling of GM foods is only one of the examples in existence which generate controversy.  
Geographical indications, a favourite of the EU, are another. 
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labelling is regarded as an unnecessary barrier to trade because it may affect consumers’ 
preferences in a way which is detrimental to exporters who, otherwise, would claim to 
have a cost advantage over the equivalent product produced in the importing country and 
which they are being denied by labelling.  Nevertheless, labelling is permitted under the 
TBT Agreement (WTO 1995, pp. 138-162).  The important issue is whether countries 
might harmonise their different domestic schemes (see Sheldon and Josling 2002, Table 
1) or whether, through international negotiation, they are harmonised.  It turns out that 
this is a fundamental distinction for the welfare of countries with different preferences 
and with different costs of production, as will be explored below (Section 3). 
  In contrast with the position adopted by the U.S. is that by the EU.  Kerr (1999) 
quotes the EU Commissioner for Agriculture as proposing a re-negotiation of the SPS 
Agreement to take consumers’ preferences into account.  He also reports that the U.S. 
negotiator for agriculture was aghast at such a proposal.  Was each side merely reflecting 
the interest of its farmers or was there a genuine difference of view about the need to 
recognise the place of consumers in designing international trade rules for food products? 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 contains a brief 
review of some theoretical models of international trade in which minimum standards are 
imposed on the imported good which has a credence characteristic.  Section 3 presents a 
sketch of a model which captures some stylised facts about international trade in a 
transgenic food.  Some conclusions are presented in Section 4. 
 
2.  Review of the Literature 
  The analysis of asymmetric information developed by Ackerlof (1970) found its 
way into the international trade literature in papers by Bond (1984), Donnenfeld et al. 
(1985), Falvey (1989), Creane (1998), Bureau et al. (1998), Roe and Sheldon (2001) and 
Jansen and de Faria (2002), amongst others.  Bond and Donnenfeld et al. assumed that the 
imperfect information arose from a credence characteristic of the good, while Falvey 
assumed an experience characteristic which allowed firms to establish reputations.  
Because of the credence characteristic of quality, consumers know only the average 
quality of the product.  Bond assumed that consumers had heterogeneous preferences for 
quality and found that the imposition of a minimum quality standard placed on the 
imported good, which was known by consumers to be of lower quality than the 
domestically produced good, in general raised overall consumer welfare.  This result 
occurred because the minimum import standard raises the average quality of the good in 
the domestic market and, thereby, increases consumers’ welfare.  In the absence of the 
minimum standard, only the low-quality product is produced and the high qualities 
disappear from the market because firms take the price as given, and the maximum profit 
occurs at the lowest quality.  Bureau et al. applied a similar model to that of Bond’s to the 
example of the EU-U.S. trade dispute over hormone-treated beef.  They investigated the 
welfare effects in the EU and the world of the import ban.  In the absence of learning by 
consumers about the effects of hormone-treated beef on their health, the authors 
concluded that, theoretically, it was possible for the ban to raise welfare in the EU but to 
lower it overall.  Donnefeld et al. assumed that preferences were homogeneous but that 
incomes varied across consumers.  In the importing country the good was supplied 
domestically by a monopoly.  The imposition of a minimum import standard raises 
quality but reduces the monopolist’s profit and may or may not increase welfare. 
  The results obtained by Bond seem to be intuitively reasonable but they may not 
be robust.  For example, Creane investigated whether consumers would be better off 
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price and quality is exogenous.  He concluded that, in the short run, consumers can be 
made worse off from knowing the quality of the product because learning reduces 
competition amongst firms and increases the import price.  This conclusion was also 
obtained when he assumed that firms compete on the basis of Salop’s model of horizontal 
product differentiation under imperfect competition.  It is not clear whether the contrast in 
the conclusions to be drawn from Bond’s and Creane’s models are due to the difference 
between vertical and horizontal product differentiation, respectively, or to other reasons, 
e.g., market power and/or strategic interaction amongst domestic firms. 
  Roe and Sheldon also use a model of imperfect competition, with a vertically 
differentiated product, to investigate the effects of labelling on consumers’ welfare.  They 
consider two types of labelling scheme, namely, continuous and binary.  In the absence of 
labelling and international trade, a single firm supplies the lowest quality.  With trade and 
continuous labelling, consumer welfare increases; while with binary labelling, the 
outcome depends upon whether the two countries harmonise their threshold levels or 
whether they choose mutual recognition.  With harmonisation, overall consumer welfare 
increases in the country but low-income consumers lose.  With a scheme of mutual 
recognition, the outcome for consumers is ambiguous, depending upon the size of the gap 
between the standards upon which the labels are issued.  Clearly, this aspect of Roe and 
Sheldon’s results has important implications for the WTO and, in particular, for the way 
in which the TBT Agreement is used. 
 
3.  A Sketch of a Model 
  The following sketch draws heavily on the papers by Bond (1984) and Jansen and 
de Faria (2002) in which their innovation for trade policy arises on the consumption side 
of the market.  The purpose here is only to show that consumers’ preferences are an 
important determinant of the welfare outcomes from attempting to solve the market 
failure inherent in the credence characteristic of quality in a world in which there is 
international trade.  Assume a two-country world (Home and Foreign) in partial 
equilibrium. 
  Consumers have heterogeneous preferences over the quality of a good, where 
quality is a credence characteristic.  Consumers’ preferences over quality are different in 
the two countries with those in the Home country being higher on average than those in 
the Foreign country.  In the Home country quality is distributed in the interval [ql, q
h] 
with average quality q .  Consumers are indexed by their preference for quality, θ, which 
is restricted to the interval [θl, θ
h].  A consumer’s willingness to pay for quality q is θq 
and the price paid is p.  So long as the net benefit, (V(p, q , θ) = θq  − p), is non-negative, 
then the consumer will purchase one unit of the good.  Hence  ) , , ( θ q p V = 0 determines 
the number of consumers in the market. 
  Producers are atomistic and can choose which quality to produce in order to 
maximise profits.  Each firm produces only one unit.  It is assumed that the total costs of 
production are an increasing and convex function of quality (i.e., C(q) > 0, C′(q) and 
C′′(q) ∀q).  There is freedom of entry.  Firms individually know which quality they 
produce but consumers do not. 
  Given this structure of information, the price received depends upon the expected 
quality as perceived by consumers and upon the choices made by firms.  There will be 
only one market price.  Hence, the individual profit-maximising firm will choose that 
quality which maximises the difference between the given price and its costs of 
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p = C(ql).  Therefore, only the lowest quality of the good is available and consumers who 
value higher quality do not find it available. 
  In the Foreign country, the same assumptions hold, except it is assumed that the 
costs of production are lower there than in the Home country and that consumers’ 
preferences for quality are lower too on average.  Under the assumption of perfect 
information about quality, if trade took place between these countries, Foreign would 
export to Home and, relative to autarky, both would be better off.  In particular, all 
consumers in the Home country would gain.  However, in the model assumed here, where 
there is asymmetric information about a credence characteristic, and the expected quality 
in Foreign is less than that in Home, do consumers in Home gain or lose in moving from 
autarky to free trade?  The answer is provided through reference to Figure 1. 
  Consider the function labelled Va.  It shows the net benefit to consumers in the 
Home country in autarky when quality ql is the only one available.  When free trade is 
permitted, consumers’ expectations about quality in Home fall.  This is shown by the 
flatter slope of the function Vt.  But because the overall quality is now lower and the costs 
of production and price are lower too, the vertical intercept is higher.  New consumers 
enter the market as shown by the horizontal intercept with trade being to the left of that in 
autarky.  Thus, they gain from trade.  But consumers to the right of where the two lines 
intersect, θi, who place a value on high qualities, are made worse off because trade lowers 
expected quality and, even although the price has fallen, the level of net benefit from 
consumption that they can achieve falls, Vt < Va for θi < θ § θ
h.  Consumers who were 
previously consuming the lowest domestic quality will be indifferent to trade.  Whether 
consumers in total gain or lose depends upon the nature of the distribution of consumers 
along the interval [θl, θ
h]. 
  Suppose now that a labelling scheme were to exist in each country but, because 
preferences for quality differ, so too will the schemes.  In particular, the minimum 
permitted quality to be given to the high-quality label is set at a higher quality in the 
Home country than in the Foreign country.  When trade is permitted, three possibilities 
emerge:  either the two governments agree to recognise each other’s label and accord 
each other’s product national treatment;  or they allow an international organisation to set 
a harmonised standard which is somewhere between these national standards;  or each 
ignores the other’s label altogether.  What now will be the welfare effects of labelling as 
compared with no labelling?  It turns out that, without imposing more structure on the 
model, it is not possible to come to any general conclusions (Jansen and de Faria). 
  These authors explore the various cases by assuming first of all that costs of 
production are the same in both countries but allowing preferences to differ.  If the 
governments decide on the mutual recognition option, then high quality production will 
cease and welfare in that country will fall.  Hence, using the assumptions made above that 
the Home country has a greater preference for high quality, it loses.  If the second option 
is chosen and harmonisation is accomplished by an international body which sets the 
standard, then Home will lose less than it does with mutual recognition, the amount 
depending upon the distance between the harmonised standard and its prior national 
standard.  Suppose now that costs differ, as assumed above, but preferences are the same.  
Jansen and de Faria (pp. 21-22) delineate six cases but show that the country with the 
higher costs will in all cases gain more from harmonisation of standards than from mutual 
recognition and will gain relative to autarky.  Finally, if the governments choose not to 
recognise the other’s standard, then trade is never inferior to autarky regardless of 
  5differences in cost or preferences.  Therefore, an import ban cannot be justified on 
welfare grounds as a way of removing the market failure. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
  The purpose in this paper has been to argue that consumers’ preferences should be 
taken into account in designing trade rules for food products which possess the credence 
characteristic, quality.  One way in which a government can overcome the information 
asymmetry, and associated market failure, is to use a labelling scheme.  It was shown that 
countries have adopted different approaches in terms of whether the labelling should be 
voluntary or mandatory, based in part on whether they use the equivalence or 
precautionary principle. 
  The theoretical literature provides some support for binary labelling based upon a 
minimum standard when the qualities of the imported and domestically produced good 
are different but consumers with heterogeneous preferences cannot identify the quality in 
the absence of labelling.  However, whether or not consumers in aggregate are better off 
with a labelling scheme depends upon the distribution of preferences:  some consumers 
will lose from the imposition of a higher standard and others, those with a preference for 
high quality, will lose without labelling.  The outcome also depends upon whether 
countries decide to recognise each other’s standard or whether they choose to harmonise 
on an international standard.  It was reported that harmonisation raises welfare in all cases 
but mutual recognition need not. 
  The argument put in this paper has been based upon economics.  Clearly, in the 
context of the WTO and any re-negotiation of the SPS Agreement that might take place, 
political economy would need to be used.  A comparison of the policy conclusions 
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Va = θql − pa 
Vt = θq
* − pt 
V(p, q, θ) 
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